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Abstract: As it is standardly conceived, Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is 
a form of ampliative inference in which one infers a hypothesis because it provides 
a better potential explanation of one’s evidence than any other available, 
competing explanatory hypothesis. Bas van Fraassen famously objected to IBE 
thus formulated that we may have no reason to think that any of the available, 
competing explanatory hypotheses are true. While revisionary responses to the 
Bad Lot Objection concede that IBE needs to be reformulated in light of this 
problem, reactionary responses argue that the Bad Lot Objection is fallacious, 
incoherent, or misguided. This paper shows that the most influential reactionary 
responses to the Bad Lot Objection do nothing to undermine the original 
objection. This strongly suggests that proponents of IBE should focus their efforts 
on revisionary responses, i.e. on finding a more sophisticated characterization of 
IBE for which the Bad Lot Objection loses its bite. 
Keywords: Inference to the Best Explanation; the Bad Lot Objection; 
underconsideration; ranking of theories; inductive cogency. 
 
1. Introduction 
As it is standardly conceived, Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is a form of 
ampliative inference in which one infers a hypothesis because it provides a better potential 
explanation of one’s evidence than any other available, competing explanatory hypothesis. 
Bas van Fraassen (1989: 142-143) famously objected to IBE thus formulated that we may 
have no reason to think that any of the available, competing explanatory hypotheses are 
true. The hypotheses one has so far generated (i.e. made available) may all be false, in 
which case the true explanation would be provided by a hypothesis outside of the set of 
available hypotheses. In that case, IBE would lead us to a false conclusion, no matter how 
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good we are at finding the best explanatory hypothesis among the available competitors. 
This Bad Lot Objection is often considered to be one of the main threats to IBE as an 
cogent form of ampliative inference; as such, it has shaped much of the debate about IBE 
in the last few decades.
1
 
 Responses to the Bad Lot Objection fall into two broad categories. On the one 
hand, van Fraassen’s objection has prompted some philosophers to find a more 
sophisticated characterization of IBE for which the objection does not arise. Such a 
revisionary response can be achieved in various ways – by adding some further conditions 
on the applicability of IBE (e.g. by adding the restriction that the best explanation must also 
meet some minimal requirements of explanatory goodness); by weakening the form of the 
conclusion (e.g. by replacing truth simpliciter with approximate truth, probable truth, or 
probable approximate truth); or indeed by re-conceiving of IBE as playing merely an 
auxiliary role in some other epistemological framework (e.g. probabilistic or ‘Bayesian’ 
epistemology).
2
 On the other hand, some philosophers have responded to the Bad Lot 
Objection by attacking van Fraassen’s argument directly – arguing that van Fraassen has not 
identified a reason to revise or reformulate our original definition of IBE. These 
reactionary responses are the topic of this paper. 
 I will discuss what I consider to be the three most prominent responses of this kind 
– two responses due to the most influential proponent of IBE, Peter Lipton (1993; 2004: 
151-163), and a more recent response from a leading member of a new generation of IBE-
                                                 
1  The objection is also known as the Argument from Underconsideration (see, e.g., Lipton 1993, 
2004; Wray 2008; Khalifa 2010). A related issue is the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (PUA; see Sklar 
1981, Stanford 2006, Wray 2011) – a problem for scientific realism motivated by a historical induction similar 
to the famous Pessimistic Meta-Induction (Poincaré 1952, Laudan 1981, Cassirer 1991). I will not be directly 
discussing PUA here, since (i) my focus here is on the purely epistemological issue of how to conceive of IBE 
rather than its application in the scientific realism debate, and (ii) PUA has been discussed at length elsewhere 
(see, e.g., Chakravartty 2008, Magnus 2010, Devitt 2011, Egg 2016, Dellsén forthcoming). 
2  Indeed, van Fraassen (1989: 145-170) famously considers such a role for IBE at length within a 
Bayesian framework, although he ends up rejecting that IBE can play even this more modest role. Other 
authors have been more optimistic, either because they reject van Fraassen’s argument (e.g., Douven 1999, 
2013) or because they reject van Fraassen’s conception of how to locate IBE in a Bayesian framework (e.g., 
Okasha 2000, Weisberg 2009, Henderson 2014). 
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advocates, Jonah Schupbach (2014).
3,4
 Lipton’s first argument is that the Bad Lot Objection 
can always be avoided since any comparative evaluation of available competing explanatory 
hypotheses can be made to collapse into an absolute evaluation of those hypotheses. In his 
second argument, Lipton argues that the Bad Lot Objection is incoherent because the 
assumption that we can find the best explanatory hypotheses in a given set entails that we 
are generally disposed to have made the true theory available. Finally, Schupbach’s 
argument is that the Bad Lot Objection is simply misguided in that it faults IBE for failing 
to guarantee that ‘good material content’ is brought to the inferential table, whereas the 
mark of a cogent inference form is that it reliably preserves good material content; 
Schupbach’s idea is that it is not the fault of IBE per se – understood as an inference form 
– that it should be possible to include only false hypotheses in the set of available, 
competing explanatory hypotheses from which an IBE is made. 
 In the bulk of this paper – sections 2, 3, and 4 – I discuss these reactionary 
responses to the Bad Lot Objection one by one, arguing that none of the responses 
undermines the objection. Although my conclusions in this paper are almost entirely 
negative, I will end each section with a somewhat more positive diagnosis of why these 
reactionary responses were destined to fail. Furthermore, my arguments strongly suggests 
that proponents of IBE would do well to focus their efforts on revisionary responses (rather 
than reactionary responses), i.e. on finding a more sophisticated characterization of IBE 
for which the Bad Lot Objection loses its bite. In the conclusion (section 5), I suggest that 
proponents of IBE have a great deal of work to do in this regard, and briefly discuss how a 
‘Peircean’ conception of IBE avoids the Bad Lot Objection in an elegant way. 
 Before we begin, it is worth pointing out that although the Bad Lot Objection is 
often presented as a special problem for scientific realists – who often rely on IBE as the 
cornerstone of their epistemology (see, e.g., Psillos 1999) – it’s clear that many anti-realists 
                                                 
3  Schupbach’s response has already been endorsed by Peter Brössel (2015). 
4  I am only aware of two other reactionary responses to the Bad Lot Objection – due to Psillos (1996) 
and Iranzo (2001) respectively. Both responses are closely related to Lipton’s second response (discussed in 
section 3 below). 
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should be equally concerned with van Fraassen’s objection (including, arguably, van 
Fraassen himself).
5
 After all, the objection, if sound, would undermine the epistemic merits 
of IBE quite generally, regardless of whether it is being applied to observable everyday 
objects, or the theoretical posits of contemporary science. Indeed, the Bad Lot Objection 
is relevant to philosophical argumentation itself, which is increasingly (though often 
implicitly) based on employing IBE, complete with arguments that one’s favorite 
philosophical theory should be accepted because it provides a better explanation than its 
currently available competitors.
6
 If the Bad Lot Objection cannot be dismissed, this piece 
of philosophical methodology may have to be reconsidered. 
2. Does Comparative Evaluation Collapse Into Absolute Evaluation? 
The first of Lipton’s two arguments against the Bad Lot Objection aims to show that the 
comparative evaluations in which a hypothesis is taken to provide a better explanation than 
some other hypotheses collapses into an absolute (i.e. non-comparative) evaluation of each 
of the hypotheses involved in the comparison. Lipton starts by pointing out that we can 
always choose a set of available explanatory hypotheses that includes exactly two hypotheses, 
viz. the hypothesis we are concerned with, call it H i, and its negation, not-Hi. When we 
compare Hi and not-Hi, e.g. by determining that Hi provides a better explanation than not-
Hi, we are in effect absolutely evaluating Hi. So if IBE enables us to comparatively evaluate 
Hi and not-Hi, then it also enables us to absolutely evaluate H i. Note that this would not 
require us to consider the various more specific explanatory hypotheses with which H i 
competes, which is the difficulty that the Bad Lot Objection exploits. Lipton’s initial idea, 
then, is that the possibility of considering hypotheses and their negations means that IBE 
can sidestep the Bad Lot Objection altogether. 
 Lipton recognizes that his opponent has a natural reply to this maneuver, viz. to 
argue that comparisons of mere contradictories (e.g. H i and not-Hi) are generally not 
                                                 
5  For a debate about whether van Fraassen’s (1980) Constructive Empiricism is implicitly committed 
to a version of IBE (and is thus susceptible to the Bad Lot Objection in some form), see Psillos (1996), 
Ladyman et al. (1997), and Psillos (1997). 
6  Not that there is any lack of explicit appeals to IBE in philosophical reasoning. For some recent 
examples, see Neta (2004), Williamson (2007), Sider (2008), Beebe (2009), and Paul (2012). 
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feasible – that the comparisons with which IBE operates must generally be comparisons of 
more specific hypotheses that, while contraries to one another, are not mere contradictories. 
Let me elaborate on this briefly. For concreteness, consider the following run-of-the-mill 
example due to Jonathan Weisberg: 
Suppose you come home one day to find the front door open and the lock broken. 
Furniture is overturned, the contents of the shelves are on the floor, and valuables are 
missing. One explanation is that someone broke in and stole your belongings, making a 
mess in the hurried process. (Weisberg 2009: 129-130) 
Call the explanation proposed in the last sentence the break-in hypothesis. Now consider 
the negation of the burglar hypothesis – the no-break-in hypothesis – which simply claims 
that it is not the case that someone broke in, stole your belongings, and made a mess. Now, 
notice that this latter hypothesis provides no potential explanation at all of the various facts 
explained by the break-in hypothesis, e.g why the lock is broken and furniture is overturned. 
Indeed, given that the no-break-in hypothesis says only that one specific explanation for the 
state if your home is false, it is hard to see how it could possibly explain any of the facts 
explained by the break-in hypothesis at all.
7
 Thus, in so far as it makes sense to compare 
the explanatory qualities of the break-in hypothesis and its negation, IBE would trivially 
favor the former over the latter in virtue of the latter’s inability to to provide any explanation 
of the relevant facts. (If this doesn’t already strike you as absurd, notice that, by the same 
token, any hypothesis that provides a potential explanation of these facts would be trivially 
favored by IBE when compared with its negation.) In sum, then, the idea of producing 
absolute evaluations by forcing comparative evaluations of contradictories is itself 
susceptible to a problem that is at least as serious (and arguably more so) than the original 
Bad Lot Objection, viz. that IBE would generally seem to favor any explanatory hypothesis 
                                                 
7  It is important to see that it is not open to Lipton here to claim that not-HA could be compared with 
HA in terms of how well various specific alternatives to HA that jointly constitute not-HA (in the sense of being 
conjunction in a long conjunction that is equivalent to not-HA). After all, that would already require these 
various more specific alternatives to have been generated, which is what the Bad Lot Objection holds that we 
generally cannot do. 
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over its negation due to the fact that the latter will often not provide any explanation of the 
relevant facts at all.
8
 
 Anticipating this response, Lipton goes on to argue that comparative evaluations 
collapse into absolute evaluations in a way that does not require a direct comparison 
between contradictories. The argument is nothing if not ingenious: 
Suppose ... that we wish to rank the contradictories T1 and not-T1. If we find a contrary to 
T1 (say T2) that is ranked ahead of T1, then not-T1 is ranked ahead of T1, since T2 entails 
not-T1. Alternatively, if we find a contrary to not-T1 (say T3) that is ranked ahead of not-
T1, then T1 is ranked ahead of not-T1, since T3 entails T1. (Lipton 2004: 156) 
This argument implicitly appeals to a principle that is worth making explicit for the 
subsequent discussion: 
Lipton’s Principle: If X should be ranked ahead of Y, and X entails not-Y (because 
X and Y are contraries), then not-Y should be ranked ahead of Y.
9
 
Although Lipton’s principle may be controversial, e.g. because a comparison of compatible 
hypotheses in the context of IBE seems to betray the idea that IBE chooses between 
competing explanatory hypotheses (Dellsén 2016), I will not criticize Lipton’s Principle 
here. Nor will I explore whether Lipton’s argument in the quoted passage is undermined 
by the fact that it presupposes that contraries to T1 and not-T1 (i.e. Lipton’s T2 and T3 
respectively) can be found – even though the whole point of the Bad Lot Objection is that 
the relevant contraries are often hard to find. My concern, rather, is whether Lipton’s 
Principle would, if true, collapse comparative evaluations into absolute evaluations without 
                                                 
8  It is worth noting that the proponent of the Bad Lot Objection can concede that there may be are 
some cases in both a hypothesis and its negation provide (potential) explanations of the relevant facts, so 
that IBE does indeed provide comparisons of contradictories in those cases. After all, the Bad Lot 
Objection need not be seen as applicable absolutely all instances of IBE; it would suffice if it went through 
for a relatively large and/or salient class of IBEs – viz. those for which the negation of an explanatory 
hypothesis is too uninformative to provide a potential explanation of the relevant facts. Although I cannot 
myself think of a plausible example of this sort, I do invite others to try. 
9  I take it that the motivation for Lipton’s Principle is something along the following lines: If X entails 
not-Y, then X cannot be more probable than not-Y (this is a theorem of the probability calculus), so not-Y 
should be ranked above or level with X. Given that IBE-ranking is transitive, it follows that if X should be 
ranked above Y, not-Y should be ranked above Y as well. 
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requiring the very same kind of comparisons that have already been shown to be highly 
problematic.
10
 
 Notice first that in order for Lipton’s argument to succeed, it would have to be 
possible to create (or recreate) the two kinds of scenarios Lipton imagines (involving T1, 
T2, and T3) for any theory that is being evaluated by IBE. After all, Lipton is arguing here 
that comparative evaluations collapse into absolute evaluations, so it wouldn’t suffice to 
merely show that there are some cases in which an absolute evaluation can be achieved by 
means of a comparative evaluation. Accordingly, we must interpret Lipton here as 
presenting a general method for achieving absolute evaluations through comparative 
evaluations. A second thing worth noting is that Lipton actually presents two methods (or, 
if you prefer, two parts of one method) for absolutely evaluating T1 through comparative 
evaluations of contraries. The two methods are supposed to be complementary in that the 
first method delivers a verdict when not-T1 should be ranked above T1 (but is inconclusive 
when T1 should be ranked above not-T1), while the second method delivers a verdict when 
                                                 
10  As far as I am aware, the current literature on the Bad Lot Objection contains only two direct 
responses to this argument, given by Wray (2008) and Khalifa (2010) respectively. However, by my lights, 
Wray and Khalifa misinterpret Lipton in different ways, leading them to criticize less plausible versions of 
Lipton’s argument. Although I cannot hope to do full justice to Wray’s and Khalifa’s responses here, let me 
nevertheless indicate here where my interpretation of Lipton’s argument differs from theirs. 
 On Wray’s reading of Lipton’s argument, Lipton is appealing to the fact that for any two contraries 
T1 and T2, there will be some hypothesis H1 such that T1 entails H1 while T2 entails not-H1. Wray then 
goes on to argue that this does not allow us to infer that either T1 (or T2) “in all its details is likely true” (Wray 
2008: 323, emphasis in original), only at most that an entailed consequence H1 (or not-H1) is true. However, 
this response seems to me to misrepresent Lipton’s original argument. As Lipton presents his strategy, the 
aim is not merely to find some hypothesis H1 entailed by T1 and contradicted by T2. Rather, the point of 
the strategy is to get a ranking of a pair of contradictories T1 and not-T1, where there are no restrictions 
placed on what sort of theory T1 can be. Thus, as far as I can tell, there is no reason to think that Lipton’s 
strategy would only allow us to infer a weaker hypothesis H1 that follows from T1. 
 Khalifa argues that Lipton’s strategy would make scientists incoherent rankers. To show this, Khalifa 
starts by assuming that we are ranking T1 and not-T1, and that we’ve found (as per Lipton’s strategy) a contrary 
to T1, viz. T2, that is ranked ahead of T1 so that (according to Lipton’s principle) not-T1 would be ranked 
ahead of T1. Next Khalifa supposes that there is another contrary of T1 that is ranked below T1 (Khalifa 
calls this theory T3, though note that T3 would be a different theory than Lipton’s T3, which is a contrary of 
not-T1). Khalifa then claims that “[s]ince T3 entails not-T1, once again invoking the quotation above [the 
same Lipton quotation I have provided on the previous page], T1 is ranked ahead of not-T1” (Khalifa 2010: 
93). If Khalifa is right about this, then Lipton’s strategy delivers the incoherent result that T1 should 
simultaneously be ranked both above and below not-T1. However, I cannot see any reason to attribute to 
Lipton the view that since T3 entails not-T1 (where T3 is a contrary to T1), T1 should be ranked above not-
T1. It certainly does not follow from Lipton’s Principle, which is silent on whether the higher ranked of two 
contraries should be ranked above its contradictory. 
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T1 should be ranked above not-T1 (but is inconclusive when not-T1 should be ranked 
above T1). 
 A third thing to notice is that it is only the second method that is of any real interest 
in the context of defending IBE against the Bad Lot Objection. To see why, notice that 
what we are interested in when we’re worried about the Bad Lot Objection is the (absolute) 
epistemic status of the highest ranked available explanatory hypothesis; we are not, by 
contrast, interested in the status of any of the lower ranked hypotheses in a set of available 
competing explanatory hypotheses, since these have already been ruled out as non-
inferrable by IBE on account of their ranking below some other highest-ranked hypothesis. 
However, Lipton’s first method can deliver absolute verdicts only about lower ranked 
contrary hypotheses, since it is part of the method itself to find a contrary explanatory 
hypothesis, viz. T2, that ranks above the hypothesis in question, viz. T1. To be sure, this 
would give us an absolute evaluation of T1 in virtue of indirectly enabling us to compare 
T1 and not-T1, but the fact that we would at that point have discovered T2, which ranks 
above T1, means that T1 would already be ruled out as uninferrable by IBE in virtue of 
ranking below T2. At that point, it would only be the absolute evaluation of T2 that would 
possibly be of interest in so far as we are concerned with the Bad Lot Objection, but notice 
that Lipton’s method would have given us no way to make the relevant comparative 
evaluation of T2 and not-T2. Hence we have the somewhat paradoxical situation that this 
method applies only in cases in which the verdict it delivers is useless for the purposes of 
defending IBE against the Bad Lot Objection.
11
 
                                                 
11  If you found that argument hard to follow, consider this example: A detective is investigating a 
murder, and has used IBE to determine that suspect number i is the most plausible contender for having 
committed the crime (call this hypothesis Si). Having recently read about the Bad Lot Objection, our detective 
is worried that Si is merely the best of a bad lot of hypotheses, so she decides to use Lipton’s first method to 
get an absolute (and not merely comparative) evaluation of this hypothesis. If she is successful at all, this will 
involve finding another competing hypothesis S j which is ranked above Si by IBE. At that point, however, her 
worry that Si is merely the best of a bad lot will have disappeared since S i is no longer the best of the competing 
explanatory hypotheses that are available to her. Rather, since Sj is (by assumption) better than Si, it is now Sj 
that she will worry is merely be the best of a bad lot. Since using Lipton’s first method will have given her no 
way to absolutely evaluate Sj, our detective would in effect be back where she started, again having to worry 
about whether the best available hypothesis (which has now gone from being Si to being Sj) is merely the best 
of a bad lot. 
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 This leaves us with Lipton’s second method. The idea behind this method is to 
rank T1 above not-T1 in virtue of ranking a contrary to not-T1, viz. T3, above not-T1. 
Lipton (implicitly) appeals to the fact that since T3 entails the negation of not-T1 (i.e. not-
not-T1) it also entails T1 itself. Lipton’s Principle then implies that if T3 should be ranked 
above not-T1, then T1 (which is entailed by T3) should be ranked above not-T1 as well. 
Hence Lipton’s Principle would get us a comparison, i.e. a ranking, of the contradictories 
T1 and not-T1 via a comparison of the contraries T3 and not-T1. If this method really 
worked, it would indeed provide an absolute evaluation of a given theory via a comparison 
of contraries even in the more interesting case where we haven’t already found a competing 
theory that is ranked above the theory in question. 
 However, this method is inapplicable for a different reason, viz. that we have been 
given no reason to think that a comparison between T3 and not-T1 is any more feasible 
than a comparison between T1 and not-T1. To see why, note that since T3 necessarily 
entails T1 (though presumably not vice versa, since that would make T1 and T3 equivalent) 
T3 is equivalent to a conjunction in which T1 is one of the conjuncts. In other words: 
T3 ≡ T1 & P 
where P is some proposition not entailed by T1. But if a comparison between a theory and 
its negation is not feasible in the first place, then clearly it is not feasible to compare the 
very same negation with a conjunction of the theory and some additional claim. Returning 
to our example of the the apparent burglary, Lipton’s second method would have us rank 
the break-in hypothesis and its negation, the no-break-in hypothesis, via a comparison of 
the latter with a stronger version of the former, e.g. the break-in hypothesis conjoined with 
a claim about the exact time of the burglary (call this the timed-break-in hypothesis). 
However, if we couldn’t already use IBE to compare the break-in hypothesis with its 
negation, the no-break-in hypothesis, then surely we will be no better off comparing the 
timed-break-in hypothesis with the no-break-in hypothesis. If anything, it is even more 
puzzling how these two hypotheses could be compared by IBE, since the former now 
makes a claim about the time of the supposed break-in that the latter hypothesis fails to 
even address. In sum, then, Lipton’s second method does not provide a way to feasibly 
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rank contradictories in the way that would be required for comparative evaluations to 
collapse into absolute evaluations as Lipton envisages. 
 Let me conclude this section by attempting to diagnose why Lipton’s attempt to 
sidestep the Bad Lot Objection by collapsing comparative and absolute evaluations was 
destined to fail. The problem with Lipton’s idea is not that ranking contraries is always 
feasible while ranking of contradictories never is, for we have seen that the problem is no 
less serious in a case of contraries that aren’t contradictories, viz. in the comparison of the 
the no-break-in hypothesis with a strengthened version of the break-in hypothesis, the 
timed-break-in hypothesis. Rather, the problem is that hypotheses that are mere negations 
of genuinely explanatory hypotheses (e.g. the no-break-in hypothesis) generally just aren’t 
the sort of hypotheses that could be feasibly compared in IBE with genuinely explanatory 
hypotheses (e.g. the break-in hypothesis). Hence, there is no general algorithm with which 
to generate a genuinely explanatory contradictory that could be compared in IBE so as to 
obtain an absolute evaluation of a given hypothesis. This is not to say that it is impossible 
to find cases in which a genuinely explanatory hypothesis and its negation can be feasible 
be compared (see footnote 9), but it does mean that Lipton’s attempt to collapse 
comparative evaluations into absolute evaluations does not succeed. 
3. Does Reliable Ranking Entail Reliable Theory-Generation? 
Lipton’s second argument against the Bad Lot Objection aims to show that there is a hidden 
incompatibility in the presuppositions of the objection. As Lipton points out, the Bad Lot 
Objection is meant to grant that scientists and others who use IBE
12
 are, at least generally, 
capable of reliably comparing hypotheses via IBE so that a more probable hypothesis is 
ranked above a less probable competitor. However, says Lipton, reliable ranking of this 
kind would be impossible unless relevant background theories were at least largely and/or 
approximately true, since false background theories “would skew the ranking, leading in 
                                                 
12  Judging by Lipton’s formulations of his second response, it appears that he is exclusively or at least 
primarily concerned with whether scientists are susceptible to the Bad Lot Objection. Although Lipton’s 
response does not seem to me to be restricted to any particular group of epistemic agents, I will nevertheless 
follow Lipton in formulating his response in terms of whether scientists are prone to generate approximately 
true theories. 
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some cases to placing an improbable theory ahead of a probable competitor, and perhaps 
leading generally to true theories, when generated, being ranked below falsehoods.” (Lipton 
2004: 157) Lipton goes on to argue that these background theories could only be largely 
and/or approximately true if (approximately) true theories had a strong tendency to be 
generated in IBE, since the theories in question “are themselves the result of prior 
generation and ranking” (Lipton 2004: 157). Hence the assumption that scientists are 
reliable rankers of theories entails, according to Lipton, that they will tend to generate the 
relevant (approximately) true explanatory hypotheses, contrary to what the Bad Lot 
Objection presupposes. We can sum up this argument as follows: 
P1. Scientists are reliable rankers of theories. 
P2. If scientists are reliable rankers of theories, then their background theories are 
at least largely and/or approximately true. 
P3. If scientists’ background theories are largely and/or approximately true, then 
they generally generate approximately true theories. 
C. So, scientists generally generate approximately true theories. [From P1, P2, and 
P3.] 
If this argument is sound, it shows that proponents of the Bad Lot Objection cannot 
simultaneously concede that scientists are reliable rankers of theories and maintain that we 
generally have no reason to think that (approximately) true theories are among those that 
have been made available in IBE’s first step. 
 Before we get to my main criticism of this argument, it is worth noting that P3 
presupposes something that proponents of the Bad Lot Objection could reasonably reject, 
viz. that the relevant background theories are established by the same method of generation 
and comparative evaluation (namely, IBE) as the ‘foreground’ theories that scientists are 
assumed to be capable of reliably ranking in premise P1. But why should a proponent of 
the Bad Lot Objection, whose entire point is that IBE (as it is standardly formulated) is not 
a reliable form of ampliative inference, accept that our current background theories were 
established in that way? It is surely more natural for the proponent of the Bad Lot 
Objection to argue (as van Fraassen appears to do himself, e.g. in his 1989: 131-2) that IBE 
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as standardly formulated is something philosophers have dreamed up in recent decades 
rather than the faithful description of scientists’ actual inferential practices that proponents 
of IBE usually take it to be (e.g., McMullin 1992). So, in sum, premise P3 appears to beg 
an important question against at least some proponents of the Bad Lot Objection, viz. 
whether our background theories are in fact established by IBE. 
 However, my main criticism of Lipton’s argument concerns not P3, but the 
combination of P1 and P2. Specifically, I submit that there is no reading of what it is for 
scientists to be ‘reliable rankers’ on which P1 and P2 are both plausibly true. To see this, 
consider two possible conceptions of what it is for someone to be a reliable ranker:
13
 
(a) S is a reliable ranker iff, for a given pair of theories Hi and Hj, S generally ranks 
Hi above Hj just in case S’s total evidence provides more support for Hi than for Hj. 
(b) S is a reliable ranker iff, for a given pair of theories Hi and Hj, S generally ranks 
Hi above Hj just in case Hi is closer to the truth (i.e. more accurate) than Hj.
14
 
The difference between these two conceptions is that the ranking of theories is determined 
by scientists’ evidential support on conception (a) whereas it is determined by closeness to 
the truth on conception (b). Since one’s total evidence can be misleading, in the sense of 
providing more support for a less accurate theory, these two conceptions of ranking-
reliability are clearly not coextensive. The question, then, is whether Lipton’s argument 
goes through on either of these conceptions. (I will argue that it doesn’t.) 
 Conception (a) appears to be what proponents of the Bad Lot Objection have in 
mind when they are prepared to grant that scientists are reliable rankers of theories. Indeed, 
van Fraassen himself says that “the comparative judgment that this hypothesis is better than 
its actual rivals … is indeed a ‘weighing (in the light of) the evidence’” (van Fraassen 1989: 
143). So premise P1 might indeed be acceptable given this conception of ranking-reliability, 
even to proponents of the Bad Lot Objection. However, P2 is quite clearly false on this 
                                                 
13  Lipton himself does not specify what is involved in being a reliable ranker of theories. Indeed, as 
far as I can see, Lipton uses these two conceptions interchangeably (Lipton 2004: 152, 157-159). 
14  Note that one way in which Hi can be closer to the truth than Hj occurs in the special case when Hi 
is precisely true and Hj is not. 
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conception. After all, the fact that scientists are generally able to correctly evaluate the 
relative support for two (or more) theories bestowed on them by their total evidence is 
perfectly compatible with all of their background theories being radically false (i.e. not even 
approximately true). This is just a corollary of the more general point that one’s total 
evidence can be misleading – a point that is in turn analogous to the well-known fact that 
epistemically justified beliefs can be false.
15
 Of course, if one’s background theories are 
indeed radically false, then the ability to reliably rank theories in this sense will not ensure 
that more accurate theories are ranked above their less accurate competitors. But that’s 
perfectly compatible with P1 on conception (a), which says nothing about the relative 
closeness to truth of theories that are reliably ranked on this conception. 
 Consider next conception (b), which does view ranking-reliability as a matter of 
ranking theories in accordance with their relative closeness to the truth (i.e. their accuracy). 
On this conception, P2 is plausible since it seems that background theories must indeed 
generally be approximately true if the rankings of scientists are to be reliable in this sense. 
However, the issue here is that P1 is surely unacceptable on this conception. To see why, 
we need only consider cases in which scientists’ total evidence is either misleading or lacking 
with regard to a comparison between two competing explanatory hypotheses H i and Hj. 
Consider, for example, a comparison in the early 19
th
 century between Wegener’s theory 
of continental drift, and the received view of the continents as being fixed roughly where 
they are now – the fixed-continents theory. At this moment in time, the total evidence 
available to geologists arguably favored the fixed-continents theory, among other things 
because the available evidence indicated that the continents could not move as rapidly as 
Wegener’s theory predicted in some important cases. It was not until the 1950s or 1960s 
that the weight of the evidence tipped in favor of Wegener’s theory (or a version thereof, 
                                                 
15  Note that this is not just the familiar point (made in this context by Wray 2008, Khalifa 2010) that 
anti-realists such as van Fraassen will be skeptical about whether the explanatory considerations with which 
IBE operates, e.g. simplicity and explanatory scope, are genuinely epistemic reasons to believe that a 
hypothesis is true or whether they instead provide pragmatic reasons for believing or accepting these 
hypotheses. Rather, the point here is that an epistemic evaluation of a pair of hypotheses may be appropriate 
given the evidence even though that evaluation turns out to be incorrect in the sense that the favored 
hypothesis is false (or indeed further from the truth than the theory to which it is favorably compared). This 
point holds even if the one grants that explanatory considerations are genuinely epistemic reasons for belief. 
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viz. plate tectonics), among other things because of evidence gathered with the help of new 
oceanographic technology (see, e.g., Bowler and Morus 2005: 237-252). However, since 
the theory of continental drift is clearly closer to the truth than the fixed-continents theory 
(or so we assume, at least for the sake of the example), early 19
th
 century geologists would 
have to rank the theory of continental drift above the fixed-continents theory for them to 
count as reliable rankers on conception (b) even though their evidence at the time clearly 
favored the latter over the former. More generally, conception (b) implies that reliable 
rankers have some sort of direct apprehension of the available theories’ closeness to the 
truth, unmediated by their evidence at a given time. Since scientists clearly do not have 
abilities of this kind, premise P1 must be rejected on conception (b). It is even clearer that 
P1 so understood will not be found acceptable by anyone who is even remotely sympathetic 
to the Bad Lot Objection, and thus Lipton’s attempt to show that the presuppositions of 
the objection are incoherent definitely fails on this conception. 
 To summarize: There is a conception of what it is to be a reliable ranker of theories 
that makes P1 true, viz. conception (a) on which reliable ranking is determined by the 
relative evidential support of the theories that are being ranked. However, on this 
conception, P2 is false since misleading evidence could easily lead to radically false 
background theories being ranked very highly. So Lipton’s argument does not go through 
on conception (a). There is also a conception of ranking-reliability that makes P2 true, viz. 
conception (b) on which reliable ranking is determined by the relative closeness to the truth 
of the theories that are being ranked. However, on this conception, P1 is false since 
scientists do not have direct access to the relative accuracy of the theories that are being 
ranked. So Lipton’s argument does not go through on conception (b) either. I thus 
conclude that there is no plausible way to uphold both of the relevant premises, P1 and P2, 
without equivocation in the definition of ranking-reliability. Furthermore, I conjecture that 
the prima facie plausibility of Lipton’s argument is due to our own (understandable, though 
regrettable) tendency to equivocate in precisely this way, failing to distinguish between 
evaluations that match evidential support on the one hand, and closeness to the truth on 
the other. 
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4. Does IBE Nevertheless Preserve Good Material Content? 
Let us turn now to a more recent response to the Bad Lot Objection, one that is due to 
Jonah Schupbach (2014) and advocated in a similar context by Peter Brössel (2015). 
According to Schupbach, the Bad Lot Objection faults IBE for failing to guarantee that 
“good material content” is brought to the inferential table, whereas the mark of a cogent 
inference form is that it reliably “preserves good material content”. (Schupbach 2014: 59) 
To see what Schupbach means by this, consider the basic form of IBE (as standardly 
formulated):
16
 
P1. E. 
P2. Among the available, competing explanatory hypotheses {H1,…,Hn}, Hi proffers 
the best potential explanation of E. 
C. Hi. 
Schupbach’s idea is that in cases where we have a bad lot of hypotheses – i.e. a set {H1,…,Hn} 
in which all the hypotheses are false – the second premise in this inference form does not 
contain ‘good material content’. However, Schupbach argues, it is not the fault of IBE per 
se – understood as an inference form – that it should be possible to include only false 
hypotheses in the set {H1,…,Hn} of available, competing explanatory hypotheses from which 
an IBE is made. That just shows that IBE, much like deductive inference forms such as 
modus ponens, cannot guarantee that it delivers good conclusions unless it is being fed 
good material from the outset. 
Schupbach’s argument relies on the distinction between an inference form and the 
material content that is being fed into that inference form in a particular instance. A sound 
criticism of IBE would have to show that IBE is faulty qua inference form, but Schupbach 
claims that the Bad Lot Objection shows no such thing. Instead, it shows only that it is 
possible for the conclusions one reaches via IBE to be unwarranted if one starts out by 
                                                 
16  This formulation of IBE is lifted verbatim from Schupbach (2014: 58) to ensure that we are 
operating with the exact same conception of IBE, except that I have used capitalized symbols for hypotheses 
and evidence. 
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feeding IBE bad material content. But this cannot be a special problem for IBE since it is 
a feature of any inference for whatsoever: 
[…] by virtue of their formal character, [inference forms] provide us with few constraints on 
the quality of the material that may be used to instantiate them on any occasion. […] when 
working with bad material content, virtually any inference form will likely commend a false 
conclusion. (Schupbach 2014: 58) 
Schupbach goes on to argue that we should evaluate IBE in the same way he claims we 
should evaluate any other inference form, i.e. by considering whether it “preserves good 
material content”: 
When evaluating any inference form, we do not ask whether that form somehow guarantees 
the quality of the material content that we plug into it on any particular occasion. In and of 
itself, a decidedly cogent inference form may indeed give us no reason at all to expect that 
we will instantiate it with good material. Rather, we ask whether or not that inference form 
in some sense preserves good material content. (Schupbach 2014: 59 – emphasis in original)
  
However, Schupbach claims, the Bad Lot Objection does not even address the issue of 
whether IBE “preserves good material content” – it shows only that IBE, like virtually any 
inference form, delivers bad material content if it is fed bad material content. The upshot, 
then, is that the Bad Lot Objection is “just misguided” (Schupbach 2014: 55). 
As this characterization of Schupbach’s argument hopefully makes clear, a central 
notion in his defense of IBE against the Bad Lot Objection is the notion of preserving good 
material content. This is Schupbach’s criterion of inferential cogency – what he claims that 
IBE is capable of doing reliably, the Bad Lot Objection notwithstanding. It is thus surprising 
and frustrating that Schupbach does not say explicitly what he means by this key piece of 
terminology. Some of what Schupbach says indicates that he is referring to a standard 
criterion for cogency of ampliative inferences – viz. that the conclusion should be likely to 
be true, justified, or known given that the premises are true, justified, or known. However, 
other remarks suggest that Schupbach is using a non-standard criterion of cogency for 
ampliative inferences which goes beyond a relationship between the premises and the 
conclusion of a given inference. Specifically, Schupbach suggests that inferences should be 
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evaluated under the assumption that at least some of the hypotheses that are mentioned in 
their premises are true. In what follows, I discuss each possibility in turn, and argue that 
Schupbach’s response fails to undermine the Bad Lot Objection on both standard and non-
standard conceptions of what it is to preserve good material content. Thus my argument in 
what follows can be presented as a dilemma: If Schupbach is using a standard criterion of 
cogency for ampliative inferences then his criticism of the Bad Lot Objection misses its 
mark, since (I shall argue) the Bad Lot Objection does show that IBE is not cogent 
according to standard criteria of inferential cogency. If, however, Schupbach is employing 
a non-standard criterion of cogency for ampliative inferences, then Schupbach’s criticism 
is irrelevant to what the Bad Lot Objection was meant to show. 
 So suppose first that Schupbach means to be employing a standard criterion of 
cogency for ampliative inferences in his defense of IBE. Now, there is a well-known 
standard way of evaluating ampliative inference forms which is closely analogous to how we 
standardly evaluate deductive inference forms such as modus ponens. The idea is that just 
as we want deductive inferences to be such that it is impossible for the conclusion to be 
false if the premises are true, we want ampliative inferences to be such that it is improbable 
that the conclusion is false if the premises are true. Indeed, this standard way of evaluating 
ampliative inferences is adopted by Brian Skyrms (1986: 7) in an influential textbook on 
ampliative reasoning. According to Skyrms, an inference is inductively strong just in case 
the conclusion is (at least somewhat) likely to be true if the premises are true.
17
 Now, if IBE 
were inductively strong in Skyrms’s sense, then there would certainly be a straightforward 
sense in which IBE “preserves good material content” as Schupbach claims it does. Indeed, 
                                                 
17 Although this criterion is crude and perhaps incomplete, it will do for our current purposes. Indeed, 
the discussion that follows assumes only that what Skyrms calls inductive strength is a necessary condition for 
ampliative cogency. This is important because there are reasons to think that inductive strength is not plausible 
as a sufficient condition for ampliative cogency, e.g. because an inference can be inductively strong in Skyrms’s 
sense even if the premise(s) do not increase the probability of the conclusion at all. Consider, for example, 
an inference from ‘it is raining’ to ‘the world is not going to end tomorrow’. Here, the conclusion is 
presumably very probably, but not thanks to the premises. 
Skyrm’s defintion of inductive strength also raises the issue of what kind of probability is involved. 
Presumably, the probability in question would have to be some kind of evidential or epistemic probability – 
and this is indeed what Skyrms (1986: 15-20) takes it to be. I won’t explore this issue further here since it is 
orthogonal to my main concerns. 
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Schupbach’s frequent comparisons between IBE and deductive inferences might suggest 
that this is what Schupbach is arguing. (Other remarks suggest a different interpretation, 
which we will consider below.) 
However, IBE is not inductively strong, and a version of the Bad Lot Objection 
shows us why. Now, just as we can show that a form of inference is not deductively valid by 
showing that a single inference that takes this form has true premises and a false conclusion, 
we can show that a form of inference is not inductively strong by showing that a single 
inference that takes this form has true premises and a conclusion that is not likely to be 
true.
18
 So suppose some evidential statement E is true, and that some hypothesis H i provides 
the best potential explanation of E among a set of available, competing explanatory 
hypotheses {H1,…,Hn}. This ensures that the two premises of IBE are both true in this case. 
But now suppose we have a “bad lot” of hypotheses in the sense that we have good reasons 
to believe that all of the available, competing explanatory hypotheses {H1,…,Hn} are false 
given our evidence E. Then, no matter how well H i explains the relevant evidence E, Hi 
will be improbable given E. So we have that the premises of this IBE are both true while 
the conclusion Hi is not likely to be true. It follows that IBE is not an inductively strong 
form of inference. 
Let us illustrate this with a version of an example used for a different purpose by 
van Fraassen (1980: 19-20): 
P1. I hear scratching in the wall, sounds of little feet pattering, and my cheese 
disappears. 
P2. Among the available, competing explanatory hypotheses {H1: Someone is 
conducting an elaborate prank; H2: I am hallucinating and losing my memory at the 
same time; H3: The cheese has come to life and is roaming my walls}, H1 proffers 
the best potential explanation of the evidence. 
                                                 
18  Of course, this would not show that we should never use the inference form in question, but rather 
only that the inference form cannot be trusted in all instances to take us from true premises to a probable 
conclusion. This is clearly what the Bad Lot Objection was meant to show. It was not meant to show, by 
contrast, that we can never go from true premises to a probable conclusion in IBE. 
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C. H1: Someone is conducting an elaborate prank. 
To evaluate the inductive strength of this argument, let P1 and P2 be true. (Note that P2 
can be true even if none of {H1,H2,H3} are true.) Admittedly, it would be strange not to have 
considered the hypothesis that there is a mouse in the apartment, but if one hasn’t 
considered that possibility, then P2 is still true. And yet I take it that C is very improbable 
in this case. So the premises are all true and yet the conclusion is not likely to be true. 
Hence IBE is not inductively strong. 
So IBE does not “preserve good material content” in the sense of making the 
conclusion probable given the truth of the premises.
19
 One might think instead that 
“preserving good material content” is for Schupbach a matter of whether we have a 
reasonably good reason to believe the conclusion given that we have good reason to believe 
the premises. The idea would be that the “good material content” that is being “preserved” 
is justification or rationality of belief. However, IBE does not preserve good material 
content in this sense either, as should already be apparent from the discussion so far. After 
all, I may have excellent justification for premises P1 and P2 in the example above, and yet 
be utterly unjustified in believing the conclusion C on this basis. Put differently, the 
justification for premises P1 and P2 is not “preserved” through the inference to the 
conclusion C to any significant extent. This is most obvious if we also imagine that you have 
some special reasons for believing that the set of available, competing explanatory 
hypotheses does not contain a correct explanation, e.g. because your track record so far for 
coming up with correct explanations is very poor, or because a very trustworthy person tells 
you that all the explanations you have considered so far are false. But even in the original 
case, I think it should be clear that on any plausible conception of epistemic justification, 
one could be justified in believing both of the premises P1 and P2 (by perception and 
introspection respectively) and be utterly unjustified in believing the conclusion C on that 
                                                 
19  As a corollary, this also shows that IBE does not “preserve good material content” in the sense of 
it being probable that the conclusion is probable given that the premises are probable. 
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basis.
20
 (An analogous argument shows that IBE does not “preserve good material content” 
in the sense of going from known premises to conclusions that are likely to be known.) 
The key point here is that the available, competing hypotheses mentioned in the 
second premise of an IBE are not themselves premises of the inference. (If they were, then 
the conclusion would already occur in the premises, making IBE into a trivial kind of 
deductive inference.) Nor are they required to be true in order for the second premise to 
be true, as we have seen. The “bad lots” of the Bad Lot Objection are bad lots of available 
explanatory hypotheses, not bad lots of premises. With this is mind, we can say that what 
the Bad Lot Objection shows is that IBE can go from a good lot of premises to a bad 
conclusion, because we may have a bad lot of explanatory hypotheses in the second (good) 
premise. Since Schupbach’s response does not undermine this point, it remains true that 
the Bad Lot Objection shows that IBE is not a cogent form of ampliative inference on the 
standard way of evaluating ampliative inferences in terms of their inductive strength. 
A related point: Schupbach suggests that if the Bad Lot Objection were a problem 
for IBE, then it would be a problem for any inference form whatsoever, including deductive 
inference forms such as modus ponens (Schupbach 2014: 55, 57-59, 63). According to 
Schupbach, this is because no form of inference could guarantee the quality of the “material 
content” that is fed into it (Schupbach 2014: 58). We are now in a position to see what is 
wrong with this argument: What the Bad Lot Objection shows is not that IBE fails to 
guarantee the quality of the premises brought to the inferential table, but that IBE can take 
us from true premises to conclusions that are not even likely to be true. In this respect, IBE 
differs from obviously cogent forms of inference such as modus ponens, where one clearly 
cannot go from true premises to an unlikely conclusion. The key point here is again that 
                                                 
20 Different conceptions of justification will give different rationales for this verdict. For example, 
a reliabilist will want to say that forming the belief that C is true on the basis of P1 and P2 does not 
amount to following a reliable belief-forming process (because the inductive rule in question does not 
reliably take one from true premises to true conclusions). An evidentialist, by contrast, will insist that C 
is not supported by the agent’s evidence, which after all supports a competing hypothesis (that there is a 
mouse in the apartment) much more strongly. Of course, it may be possible to come up with entirely 
subjective conceptions of justification according to which the mere fact that you have only considered a 
certain set of competing explanations makes you justified in believing one of them, but I take it that no 
proponent of IBE (Schupbach included) would want to be saddled with having adopt such an extremely 
subjective view of justification in order to defend IBE against the Bad Lot Objection. 
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the premises of an IBE can be true even though all the explanatory hypotheses mentioned 
in the second premise are false, in which case the IBE in question will go from true premises 
to a conclusion that is unlikely to be true. No similar possibility can arise for obviously 
cogent inference forms such as modus ponens. Hence the Bad Lot Objection does not 
generalize in the way Schupbach claims it does. 
 We turn now to the second horn of our dilemma for Schupbach’s argument. So far 
I have shown that IBE is not an inductively strong form of inference, and is thus not 
inferentially cogent in any standard sense of taking one from true, justified, or known 
premises to conclusion that are likely to be true, justified, or known. Now, one could 
respond to this by adopting some alternative, non-standard conception of inferential 
cogency and argue that IBE is cogent in that sense, the Bad Lot Objection notwithstanding. 
Some of what Schupbach says suggests that this is the route he is taking, e.g. when he claims 
to have argued that “the goodness of IBE’s material content is additionally [i.e., apart from 
its premises being true] a matter of whether the lot of hypotheses mentioned in IBE’s 
second premise is good – i.e., whether the lot contains a true hypothesis” (Schupbach 2014: 
62). The idea seems to be that “preserving good material content” – Schupbach’s criterion 
for inferential cogency – does not concern whether the conclusion is likely to be true given 
the truth of the premises, but whether the conclusion is likely to be true given the truth of 
the premises and given the truth of at least some of the hypotheses that are mentioned in 
the premises. 
 Schupbach would certainly be right that if we use this as our criterion of inferential 
cogency for ampliative inferences, then the Bad Lot Objection would not show that IBE is 
not cogent. However, as we shall see shortly, this particular criterion is inadequate, since it 
implies that clearly fallacious inferences are cogent. Before we get to that, I want to discuss 
a more fundamental problem with this response – one that applies to any attempt to avoid 
the Bad Lot Objection by employing a non-standard conception of inferential cogency. 
The problem, in short, is that it is not clear why anyone should feel satisfied with the result 
that IBE is cogent according to a non-standard criterion of inferential cogency. What we 
care about is whether IBE takes us from premises that are true, justified, or known to 
conclusions that are likely to be true, justified, or known. If we must admit that IBE does 
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not do this (as I argued in the previous section), then why should we care whether there is 
some other non-standard criterion of inferential cogency on which IBE is cogent? 
Indeed, it would certainly be unfair to the proponent of the Bad Lot Objection – 
perhaps even question-begging – to complain that the objection fails to show that IBE is 
not cogent in some non-standard sense. It is worth noting that van Fraassen himself was 
almost certainly employing a standard criterion of cogency when he presented the Bad Lot 
Objection in Laws and Symmetry (1989). In the relevant passage, van Fraassen (1989: 142-
143) argues that even on the assumption that Hi provides the best explanation of some 
evidence E among the available hypotheses {H1,…,Hn}, the conclusion Hi could still fail to 
be “more likely to be true, than not”. (1989: 143) This is most naturally interpreted as 
criticizing IBE for failing to guarantee that its conclusion is likely to be true given that both 
of its premises are true. So even if Schupbach succeeds in showing that IBE is cogent in his 
preferred sense, this appears to be irrelevant to the objection van Fraassen presented, since 
there is no reason to think that his objection aimed to establish that IBE is not cogent in 
Schupbach’s non-standard sense. 
As mentioned above, there is a second problem with defending IBE against the 
Bad Lot Objection by using Schupbach’s non-standard criterion of cogency for ampliative 
inferences. The problem, in short, is that the criterion that Schupbach seems to adopt – 
viz. that an inductive inference is cogent iff the conclusion is likely to be true given the truth 
of the premises and given the truth of at least some of the hypotheses mentioned in the 
premises – counts clearly fallacious inference forms as cogent. To see why, consider the 
following inference form: 
P1. So far, source S has proposed hypotheses {H1,…,Hn}. 
P2. H1,…,Hn-1 have all been refuted. 
C. Hn. 
If an inductive argument is cogent whenever the conclusion is probable given the truth of 
the premises and given the truth of at least one of the hypotheses mentioned in the premises, 
then this argument is cogent. To see why, suppose P1 and P2 are true and that at least one 
of the hypotheses {H1,…,Hn} mentioned in P1 is true. Since Hn would be the only remaining 
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hypothesis in {H1,…,Hn} not refuted according to P2, Hn would at least be very likely to be 
true.
21
 However, this is clearly a very poor form of ampliative inference. Indeed, notice that 
this inference form essentially recommends trusting a source that has so far only proposed 
hypotheses that have been refuted. 
It is also worth noting that the requirement that at least some of the hypotheses 
mentioned in an argument’s premises be true clearly does not apply to deductive inferences. 
The standard criterion of cogency for deductive inferences is validity, i.e. that the 
conclusion is guaranteed to be true if the premises are true. By contrast, it is not a criterion 
of cogency for deductive inferences that the conclusion is guaranteed to be true if the 
premises are true and if at least some of the hypotheses mentioned in the premises are 
true.
22
 So the requirement that we evaluate inferential cogency under the assumption that 
at least some of the hypotheses mentioned in the premises are true (in addition to assuming 
that the premises are true) clearly cannot be generalized to deductive inferences. Contrary 
to what Schupbach suggests (2014: 57-59), the kind of cogency that applies to ampliative 
inferences such as IBE would have to be of a very different kind than the one that applies 
to deductive inferences (and not just because IBE, like any ampliative inference form, does 
not guarantee the truth of its conclusions given the truth of its premises). 
 To sum up, Schupbach’s main contention is that the Bad Lot Objection faults IBE 
for not guaranteeing the quality of the content that is fed into it. On Schupbach’s view, IBE 
does “preserve good material content” and is thus a cogent form of ampliative inference. I 
have argued that Schupbach’s response faces a dilemma: On the first horn, we evaluate 
IBE by employing a standard criterion of cogency for ampliative inferences on which such 
                                                 
21  Depending on what we read into the statement that H1,…,Hn-1 have been ‘refuted’, Hn may even be 
guaranteed to be true. 
22  Indeed, this criterion would lead to absurd results. For example, the following fallacious piece of 
reasoning would be cogent qua deductive inference: 
P. If H1 then H2. 
C. H2. 
To see why, suppose P is true and that at least one of H1 and H2 is true. Now, if H1 is true, then by P, H2 is 
true as well. So C is true in that case. But if H2 is true then C is also true. Thus C is true in either case. So C 
is guaranteed to be true given the truth of P and the truth of at least one of the hypotheses that are 
mentioned in P. 
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an inference is cogent if its conclusion is likely to be true, justified, or known given that its 
premises that are true, justified, or known. I have shown that IBE is not cogent by this 
criterion and thus does not “preserve good material content” in any straightforward sense. 
On the second horn of the dilemma, we evaluate IBE by employing a non-standard 
criterion of cogency for ampliative inferences. However, the criterion of cogency for 
ampliative inferences to which Schupbach sometimes seems to be appealing cannot be 
correct, since it implies that clearly fallacious inferences would be cogent. Moreover, the 
criterion does not generalize to deductive inferences, contrary to what Schupbach suggests. 
Finally, and most importantly, even if Schupbach’s criterion were adequate, it still would 
do nothing to undermine van Fraassen’s original Bad Lot Objection, since there is no 
reason to think that van Fraassen’s objection was employing Schupbach’s non-standard 
criterion of cogency. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In section 1, I distinguished between reactionary and revisionary responses to the Bad Lot 
Objection. In the sections that followed, I argued that that none of the three most prominent 
reactionary responses to the objection is successful. This strongly suggests that revisionary 
responses are more promising, and thus that proponents of IBE should focus their attention 
on finding a more sophisticated characterization of IBE for which the Bad Lot Objection 
loses its bite. A popular way of achieving this has been to strengthen the conditions under 
which IBE licenses inference. In particular, many have followed Alan Musgrave (1988), who 
suggested that in order for a hypothesis to be inferable by IBE the explanation it provides 
must be satisfactory, i.e. sufficiently good, in addition to being the best among those 
provided by available hypotheses.
23
 Despite its popularity, however, Musgrave’s suggestion 
                                                 
23  Somewhat paradoxically, Lipton (2004: 56, 63, 154) sometimes seems to endorse this suggestion, 
although it is unclear to what extent this is meant as a response to the Bad Lot Objection. Indeed, in his 
discussion of the Bad Lot Objection, Lipton explicitly mentions the possibility of insisting “that scientists are 
capable of absolute and not only comparative evaluation” (which is what an evaluation of an explanation as 
“sufficiently good” would require). He goes on to say that “[t]hese responses may well be correct but, baldly 
asserted, they lead to an unsatisfying standoff between those who believe in absolute evaluation ... and those 
who do not” (Lipton 2004: 154), before presenting the two reactionary responses I discussed in sections 2 
and 3. 
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has never been fleshed out with an anything resembling an account of what it is for an 
explanation to be “satisfactory,” so the current status of IBE is at best unclear on Musgrave’s 
suggestion.
24
 
 My own view is that the Bad Lot Objection calls for a different kind of revisionary 
response – one on which IBE is modified by weakening its conclusion. Specifically, I argue 
elsewhere (Dellsén MS) that the primary function of IBE is to help identify which 
explanatory hypotheses of those available it would be advisable to adopt as the working 
hypotheses around which further investigation is structured. This represents a partial return 
to some of Charles S. Peirce’s (1934, 1935) ideas about explanatory reasoning (what he 
usually called ‘abduction’), in that Peirce describes ‘abduction’ as warranting only a 
probative kind of acceptance for the purposes of inductive examination (Kapitan 1992: 12-
17). Now, while the possibility of having a ‘bad lot’ of available hypotheses means that the 
risk of adopting a false proposition as a working hypotheses can often be significant, the 
Bad Lot Objection does not undermine IBE on this conception since an agent can do no 
better than to let the best of the available hypotheses guide her further investigations. 
Although I haven’t defended this view of IBE in this paper, I do hope to have shown that 
one of the problems that the view is meant to address – viz. the Bad Lot Objection – is a 
genuine epistemic difficulty that be brushed aside as fallacious, incoherent, or misguided.
25 
  
                                                 
24  The problem here is not just the familiar one of proving accounts of the explanatory considerations 
with which IBE operates – e.g. consilience, parsimony, elegance, fertility, testability – and how these 
considerations interact in an overall comparison between the explanatory goodness (i.e. loveliness) of 
different hypotheses. Musgrave’s suggestion additionally requires that there be some absolute measure of 
each explanatory consideration, and some way of determining an absolute degree of explanatory goodness 
for every hypothesis in logical space. 
25  I am grateful to Hrafn Asgeirsson and Elanor Taylor for insightful comments on earlier drafts of 
this paper. I would also like to thank three anonymous reviewers for this journal for criticisms and 
suggestions that helped to improve the paper in various respects. 
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